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NOTES AND COMMENTS
PROCEDURES FOR DISCIPLINING ATTORNEYS IN
VIRGINIA
The bar enjoys the privilege of self-discipline, but along with this
privilege there is a commensurate responsibility to protect the public'from
attorneys who are unworthy to practice.' There are those who feel that
the profession is not adequately discharging this responsibility.' The
American Bar Association Special Committee on Evaluation of Discipli-
nary Enforcement found disciplinary procedures antiquated, ineffectual,
and, in some instances, nonexistent and concluded "that the present en-
forcement structure is failing to rid the profession of a substantial number
of malefactors. '" 3 Some of the general criticisms made by the ABA
Special Committee apply to the present disciplinary system in Virginia,
but a proposed amendment to the Rules of Court, if adopted, will make
significant improvements.
THE PRESENT DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM
The Bar Procedures
In Virginia, the existing disciplinary system is divided into two parts:
proceedings before the bar and proceedings before the court.4 The su-
preme court has the authority to discipline attorneys practicing in the
state' and to delegate this function to the bar by means of the Rules of
Court.6 Rule 13 of the Rules for the Integration of the Virginia State Bar7
'Powell, The State of the Legal Profession, 90 A.B.A. REP. 391, 399 (1965).
2See, e.g., Clark, Disciplinary Procedures for the Bar, 39 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 484 (1968).
'AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 2-3
(Final Draft, June, 1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA SPECIAL COMM.].
'A short summary of the mechanics of the existing procedures in Virginia may be found
in G. BRAND, BAR ASSOCIATIONS, ATTORNEYS AND JUDGES 1018 (1956); Id. at 225 (Supp.
1959). Most disciplinary actions which come before the courts are the result of a verified
complaint filed by the bar after an independent investigation, but bringing such complaints
is not the bar's exclusive prerogative. A private citizen may make a complaint to a court
and begin disbarment proceedings. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54-74(1) (Repl. Vol. 1972); Defoe
v. Friedlander, 211 Va. 121, 176 S.E.2d 448 (1970).
5VA. CODE ANN. § 54-48(c) (Repl. Vol. 1972). See also text accompanying note 37
infra.
'VA. CODE ANN. § 54-49 (Repl. Vol. 1972).
'VA. SuP. CT. RULES pt. VI, art. IV, R. 13 (As published in 205 Va. 1011, 1040-42
(1964) and amended in 210 Va. 411 (1969)) [hereinafter cited as RULE 13].
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provides that there shall be a committee of seven to fourteen members,
selected by the Council of the State Bar in each congressional district and
that these committees shall have the duty to hear and investigate com-
plaints of misconduct made against any attorney within that district.'
Under this procedure, when a complainant reports a grievance to a
member of one of the committees, he is interviewed and required to sign
a complaint.' This complaint, which serves as the basis for the proceed-
ings, is presented to the chairman of the committee who assigns a
committee-member to investigate the matter.1" Based on the results of
this investigation, the full committee decides if the complaint should be
dismissed or if it merits a formal hearing." If a hearing is determined to
be necessary, a copy of the written complaint is given to the attorney in
question. 2 A hearing before the district committee is an adversary pro-
ceeding where the complaint is prosecuted by a member of the commit-
tee, 3 who bears the burden of proving the misconduct. The committee
has the power, supported by the contempt power of the courts, to sub-
poena witnesses and evidence for the hearing. 5 The accused attorney has
the right to have subpoenas issued for witnesses and evidence on his
behalf and the right to be represented by counsel in these proceedings.
The decentralized district committee system described above is typical
of American disciplinary systems 7 and is one of the chief targets for
critics of existing procedures. Disciplinary agencies which rely on com-
plaints alone and have no self-initiated investigations cannot uncover
some of the most serious forms of professional misconduct.' This is
because many laymen fail to bring legitimate grievances to the attention
of the committee because they fear reprisal from the attorney they com-
8RuLE 13(a).
'The requirement of a written complaint may be waived if the subject is something that
can be independently investigated, e.g. fraud. Interview with Joseph E. Hess, Secretary of
the 6th District Committee of the Virginia State Bar, in Buena Vista, Virginia, Feb. 25,
1972 [hereinafter cited as Hess Interview]. The requirement of a written complaint, signed
by the complainant, is viewed as an unnecessary formality by some. See ABA SPECIAL
COMM. 71.




"3 Interview with H. Marston Smith, Chairman of the Committee on Disciplinary





"7See G. BRAND, BAR ASSOCIATIONS, ATTORNEYS AND JUDGES (1956, Supp. 1959).
"ABA SPECIAL COMM. 6. See also Clark, Disciplinary Procedures for the Bar, 39 PA.
B. AsS'N Q. 484, 485 (1968).
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plain against 9 or because they are unaware of the existence of the com-
mittee or the identities of its members. In addition, if the client is involved
with the atiorney in an illegal scheme, the client is certainly not going to
bring such misconduct to the committee's attention. Sources other than
specific complaints by laymen are even less productive." For example, the
failure of attorneys to report instances of misconduct has been cited by
the ABA Special Committee.2
The district committees' failure to initiate their own investigations has
been attributed to a reluctance on the part of the committee members to
prosecute attorneys with whom they have close professional or social
"ties.?2 Likewise, there may be a reluctance to prosecute a prominent
attorney or a member of a prominent firm.? There may be a more
fundamental reason for the failure of the committees to initiate investiga-
tions as frequently as they might. The committee members in Virginia
are volunteers, serving without pay, and must take time from their private
practices to perform their committee functions.24
Another criticism of the decentralized committee is the lack of uni-
formity and standardization. Everything not set out by the statutes or
Rules of Court is left entirely to the discretion of the individual commit-
tees within the guidelines of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
"ABA SPECIAL CoMM. 74-75.
2For example, in the 6th district thus far this year, of the 12 complaints received, 10
came from clients, 2 from attorneys, and none originated with the committee. Hess Inter-
view, supra note 9. In the 9th district, where 9 complaints have been received, 4 came from
clients, 3 from attorneys, and 2 from members of the committee. Letter from Alan D.
Groseclose, Secretary of the 9th District Committee of the Virginia State Bar, to the
Washington & Lee Law Review, March 14, 1972, on file in the Washington & Lee Law
Library [hereinafter cited as Groseclose Letter].
'Far from reporting infractions, the Committee contends "that lawyers will not appear
or cooperate in proceedings against other lawyers but instead will exert their influence to
stymie the proceedings. ... ABA SPECIAL COMM. 1.
A Virginia source however, while agreeing that approximately seventy-five percent of
the complaints received by the district committees came from clients rather than attorneys,
maintained that the reason for this was that clients were in a better position to observe
misconduct than attorneys and were more likely to report such misconduct to the commit-
tees than to other attorneys. Interview with James R. Wrenn Jr., Special Counsel of the
Virginia State Bar, in Richmond, Va., April 3, 1972.
2ABA SPECIAL COM. 5, 24. This difficulty exists to some extent in Virginia. For
example, the commonwealth's attorney is to prosecute disbarments according to the statute
(VA. CODE ANN. § 54-74(3) (Repl. Vol. 1972)). But frequently the commonwealth's attor-
ney who should prosecute the action asks to be relieved due to friendship with the accused
attorney. Smith Interview, supru note 13. Some of the district committees would like to
have the duty of prosecution removed from the commonwealth's attorneys. Groseclose
letter, supra note 20.
2ABA SPECIAL COMM. 26.
24Smith Interview, supra note 13.
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Legal Ethics Opinions of the Virginia State Bar Committee on Legal
Ethics. Thus, evidence brought before one committee might conceivably
result in a dismissal of the complaint while the same evidence might lead
to the instigation of disbarment proceedings if brought before another
committee. An offense may be grounds for a reprimand in one district
while the same offense may be grounds for substantially harsher punish-
ment or none at all in another district. 2 There are also variations in
procedure. For example, in some districts the accused attorney is notified
that there is a complaint against him as soon as an investigator is ap-
pointed,21 while in others he has no notice until the investigator has made
his report to the committee and it has decided whether to dismiss the
complaint or launch a formal hearing. 2
A third criticism of this decentralized system has been made by the
district committees themselves." The committees have no disciplinary
power of their own. Their only alternatives are to dismiss the com-
plaint,3" file a bill in equity requesting that the attorney in question be
reprimanded and enjoined from further misconduct,3 or file a verified
complaint with the court requesting disciplinary action in the form of
suspension or disbarment. 2 Many matters which come to the attention
2Letter from James R. Wrenn, Jr., Special Counsel of the Virginia State Bar, to the
Washington & Lee Law Review, March 27, 1972, on file in the Washington and Lee Law
Library [hereinafter cited as Wrenn Letter].21ABA SPECIAL COMM. 28.
2Smith Interview, supra note 13; Groseclose Letter, supra note 20.
28Hess Interview, supra note 9. The Special Counsel for the Virginia State Bar inter-
prets paragraph (a) of present Rule 13 as follows "IT]he Committee notifies an attorney
against whom a complaint has been filed 'if the Committee finds that the report [by the
Committee member who made an initial investigation to determine if there was any merit
in the complaint] justifies further investigation ... '" (parenthetical retained). Wrenn Let-
ter, supra note 25. See Seventh Dist. Comm. of the Va. State Bar v. Gunter, 212 Va. 278,
279, 183 S.E.2d 713, 714 (1971). Of course if the investigation required an examination of
the attorney's files, he would necessarily be made aware of the complaint against him before
the conclusion of the investigation. The difference may be minor as long as the attorney is
eventually given notice, but it would seem to be fairer to the attorney if he is notified as
soon as possible, especially in minor matters where he could assist in clearing up the
dispute. See note 33 infra. However, in some instances it may be impractical from an
investigative standpoint to give notice at the first presentation of a complaint.






RULE 13(c). The decision as to which penalty is to be sought is left with the commit-
tee; there are apparently no statewide standards. One committee expressed its own guide-
lines as follows: "Our unwritten policy is that if the attorney has shown moral turpitude
(as opposed to procrastination or negligence) or if the attorney's continued practice is a
danger to the public, we would seek suspension or disbarment." Groseclose Letter, supra
note 20.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
of the committees are comparatively minor though technically unethi-
cal.3 Yet, since the committee has no disciplinary power of its own, it
must choose either to dismiss the complaint or to bring an action in court.
If it chooses the former, the committee may damage its credibility and
the trust of the public, yet the latter choice would bring highly adverse
and possibly undeserved publicity to the attorney.34
The Court Procedures
If a committee decides to seek disciplinary action in the courts, it may
bring either an action for a reprimand and an injunction or an action for
suspension or disbarment. In both instances the action is prosecuted by
the commonwealth's attorney," who may be assisted by the Attorney
General. A single judge, sitting in equity, hears suits requesting repri-
mands and injunctions and may either dismiss the complaint or grant the
relief requested."
If the committee determines that the alleged misconduct is serious
enough to merit suspension or disbarment, it will act to institute the
proceedings set out in section 54-74 of the Virginia Code.37 The commit-
3rlhe largest single category of complaints is disputes between the client and the
attorney regarding a fee. Smith Interview, supra note 13. DuPont, Psychology in Billing,
20 VA. B. NEws No. 4, at 34 (Jan.-Feb. 1972). This is generally considered by the commit-
tees to be a civil matter and not a question of ethics. Hess Interivew, supra note 9.
uSmith Interview, supra note 13; ABA SPECIAL COMM. 7, 92.
3'VA. CODE ANN. § 54-74(3) (Repl. Vol. 1972).
15Cf. 33 ANNUAL REP. VA. ST. B. 68 (1971); Appendix infra. There is no standard set
forth for the quantum of proof required to find guilt. It may be the same standard as for
disbarment: "clear proof." See text accompanying notes 42-44 infra.
"VA. CODE ANN. § 54-74 (Repl. Vol. 1972) is not the only recognized source of the
power to disbar. There is an inherent power in the courts to suspend or disbar an attorney.
This power exists independently of VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-48, -49, -74 (Repl. Vol. 1972)
and is not diminished by those sections. Norfolk & Portsmouth Bar Ass'n v. Drewry, 161
Va. 833, 172 S.E. 282 (1934); Legal Club v. Light, 137 Va. 249, 119 S.E. 55 (1923); In re
Leigh, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 183 (1810). See also Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378-
79 (1866). ABA SPECIAL COMM. criticizes statutes which tend to limit the inherent powers
of the court to discipline attorneys who are considered to be officers of the courts. Id. at
10-18.
This power may be codified in VA. CODE ANN. § 54-73 (Repl. Vol. 1972) which states:
Any court before which an attorney has qualified, on proof being made
that he has been convicted of a felony or of any malpractice, or of any
corrupt unprofessional conduct, shall revoke his license to practice therein
or suspend the same for such time as the court may prescribe.
Id.
It has been held that any suspension or disbarment proceedings which are not in
accordance with the statutory provisions similar to VA. CODE ANN. § 54-74 (Repl. Vol.
1972) are effective only vis a vis the particular forum which issued the rule. Exparte Fisher,
33 Va. (6 Leigh.) 506 (1835).
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tee must file a verified complaint with the circuit court or other court of
record, and the judge may then issue "a rule against such attorney...
to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked or
suspended. 38 If the judge issues the rule to show cause, a panel of three
judges, consisting of the judge who issued the rule and two others ap-
pointed by the chief justice of the supreme court, hears the case.39 In
Virginia, as in almost all other jurisdictions, disbarment proceedings are
no longer tried by a jury."
Despite the fact that they make a determination of guilt or innocence
which may result in the loss of the accused attorney's livelihood, it has
been consistently held that these proceedings are not criminal in nature.,,
This determination has important consequences. First, the standard of
proof required is not the criminal standard." In Norfolk & Portsmouth
Bar Association v. Drewry,43 it was held that "reasonable strictness of
proof is necessary before guilt should be held to be established-not proof
beyond a reasonable doubt but clear proof."
3'VA. CODE ANN. § 54-74(1) (Repl. Vol. 1972). The judge may deny or grant the
motion, and there is no appeal from his decision. DeFoe v. Friedlander, 211 Va. 121, 176
S.E.2d 448 (1970).
39
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-74(2) (Repl. Vol. 1972).
"See ABA SPECIAL COMM. 136. Jury trial was provided by an old Virginia statute, ch.
76, §§ 5, 6, [1818-19] Va. Acts. This was held to require that the statutory provisions
including the jury requirement be followed in order to effect complete disbarment, though
the court without a jury could disbar an attorney from its own forum. Exparte Fisher, 33
Va. (6 Leigh) 506 (1835).
"Maddy v. First Dist. Comm. of the Va. State Bar, 205 Va. 652, 139 S.E.2d 56 (1964);
Tucker v. Seventh Dist. Comm. of the Va. State Bar, 202 Va. 840, 120 S.E.2d 366 (1961);
Campbell v. Third Dist. Comm. of the Va. State Bar, 179 Va. 244, 18 S.E.2d 883 (1942);
Norfolk & Portsmouth Bar Ass'n v. Drewry, 161 Va. 833, 172 S.E. 282 (1934). The
rationale is that the primary purpose of the proceedings is not to punish the attorney but
to protect the public. This would seem to be very close to the rationale for criminal proceed-
ings. In fact, other jurisdictions have termed proceedings for disbarment quasi-criminal for
the same reasons given to justify the above determination. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551
(1968); Furman v. State Bar, 12 Cal. 2d 212, 83 P.2d 12, 21 (1938); State v. Denman, 36
Tenn. App. 613, 259 S.W.2d 891, 897 (1952); In re Greer, 61 Wash. 2d 741, 380 P.2d 482,
485 (1963). Quasi-criminal seems to be a more honest term in recognizing the punitive
aspects of the proceedings, but there does not seem to be any difference in the cases with
regard to the rights accorded the accused.
Virginia recognizes that the proceedings are not strictly civil either, but rather they are
sui generis. Maddy v. First Dist. Comm. of the Va. State Bar, 205 Va. 652, 658, 139 S.E.2d
56, 60 (1964).
"2Maddy v. First Dist. Comm. of the Va. State Bar, 205 Va. 652, 139 S.E.2d 56 (1964);
Tucker v. Seventh Dist. Comm. of the Va. State Bar, 202 Va. 840, 120 S.E.2d 366 (1961);
Campbell v. Third Dist. Comm. of the Va. State Bar, 179 Va. 244, 18 S.E.2d 883 (1942).
43161 Va. 833, 172 S.E. 282 (1934).
"1161 Va. 833, 843, 172 S.E. 282, 286 (1934). Clear proof is the Virginia standard. In
other jurisdictions the standards are different. See Annot., 105 A.L.R. 984 (1936).
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Although the standard of proof is lower than in a criminal proceeding,
the location of the burden of proof is the same despite what a literal
interpretation of "rule. . .to show cause why his license to practice law
shall not be revoked or suspended"45 might imply. This rule has histori-
cally been used to commence disciplinary actions against attorneys,"6 but
it has never been defined in Virginia jurisprudence. Apparently the bur-
den of persuasion remains on the complainant," just as in other actions
in Virginia. Other jurisdictions have held that the burden of producing
evidence may be on the attorney when the complainant shows what ap-
pears to be unethical conduct," and some have gone so far as to place
the burden of persuasion on the attorney to justify his conduct.,
Regardless of the location of the burden of persuasion, an attorney
could only be required to meet specific allegations of misconduct of which
he was given notice, or the proceedings would be inconsistent with the
demands of due process. In disbarment proceedings, due process is satis-
fied if the accused attorney is given notice of the charges and an opportun-
ity to explain his conduct or defend against the charges." Though notice
of the charges is necessary, a minor variance between what is alleged by
the bar and what is proved before the three-judge panel has been found
to be harmless error53 in the recent case of Seventh District Committee
of the Virginia State Bar v. Gunter.54 The court thought it immaterial that
"VA. CODE ANN. § 54-74(1) (Repl. Vol. 1972).
"See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *287.
"T he rule has been defined elsewhere as a notice motion which requires a party to
appear and show cause why a certain act should not be done or permitted. It requires the
party to meet the prima facie case made by the applicant's verified complaint or affidavit.
Morehouse v. Pacific Hardware & Steel Co., 177 F. 337 (1910); Boyd v. Louisville &
Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 313 Ky. 196, 230 S.W.2d 444 (1949);
Marshank v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 2d 602,4 Cal. Rptr. 593 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
"3The burden usually rests on the party asserting a proposition in civil suits in Virginia.
See MICHIES JURISPRUDENCE OF VA. & W. VA. Evidence § 29 (1949).
"Smith Interview, supra note 13.
"WSee, e.g., In re Kunstler, 248 App. Div. 393, 289 N.Y.S. 107 (1936); In re Salus, 321
Pa. 106, 184 A. 70 (1936).
5"People v. Lindsey, 86 Colo. 458, 283 P. 539 (1929).
52See, e.g., In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968); Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1883);
Exparte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1873); Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
523 (1869); Maddy v. First Dist. Comm. of the Va. State Bar, 205 Va. 652, 139 S.E.2d 56
(1964); Norfolk & Portsmouth Bar Ass'n v. Drewry, 161 Va. 833, 172 S.E. 282 (1934).
FSee also, Re Mayberry, 295 Mass. 155, 3 N.E.2d 248 (1936); Bar Ass'n v. Casey,
196 Mass. 100, 81 N.E. 892 (1907); Bar Ass'n v. Greenhood, 168 Mass. 169, 46 N.E. 568
(1897).
5212 Va. 278, 183 S.E.2d 713 (1971). The court also held that the attorney-client
privilege (between the accused attorney and his counsel) did not protect communications
which would perpetrate a fraud on the committee. This decision brought Virginia into
accord with the majority rule on this point. See, e.g. United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d
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the committee did not prove the exact date on which the attorney altered
certain papers since there was proof that he had altered them. However
a major variance or alteration in the charges during the proceedings has
been held to be a violation of due process by the United States Supreme
Court.55 In Virginia, the opportunity to defend includes the right to coun-
sel,56 and the right to subpoena witnesses and other evidence.1
7
At the conclusion of the trial, the three-judge panel may dismiss the
complaint, reprimand the attorney, or suspend or revoke his license. s8 The
judges have complete discretion over the choice of penalty.59 Either party
may appeal the decision of the panel to the supreme court, though if the
attorney is disbarred by the three-judge panel and appeals, he is sus-
pended while his appeal is pending.
Thus there are many problems in the existing disciplinary system.
These include a lack of uniformity in the procedures before both the
district committees and the three-judge panels; excessive burden on the
judicial system;"' and an ineffective initiation process. The bar and the
court are currently considering a Suggested Amendment of Rule 13 of
the Rules for the Integration of the Virginia State Bar which may provide
solutions to some of the problems mentioned above.
THE PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE SUGGESTED AMENDMENT
The Suggested Amendment to Rule 13 may make several important
improvements in the disciplinary system. The Amendment provides im-
1076 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
589 (1939); Strong v. Abner, 268 Ky. 502, 105 S.W.2d 599 (1937); Thomas v. Jones, 105
W. Va. 46, 141 S.E. 434 (1928). Early Virginia precedent to the contrary was overruled.
See Parker v. Carter, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 120 (1814); Clay v. Williams, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 332
(1811).
mIn re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
56VA. CODE ANN. § 54-74(7) (Repl. Vol. 1972); RULE 13(e).
51RULE 13(e).
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-74(4) (Repl. Vol. 1972). In the year ending June 30, 1971, there
were three reprimands, one revocation (disbarment), one suspension, and one surrender of
a license. Text accompanying notes 101-03 infra. 33 ANNUAL REP. VA. ST. B. 68 (1971).
See Appendix infra.
"Blum v. Tenth Dist. Comm. of the Va. State Bar, 210 Va. 5, 8, 168 S.E.2d 121, 124
(1969); Maddy v. First Dist. Comm. of the Va. State Bar, 205 Va. 652, 139 S.E.2d 56
(1964).
C'VA. CODE ANN. § 54-74(5) (Repl. Vol. 1972). Temporary suspension is intended to
protect the public from disbarred attorneys in the event the appeal is lost, but it could
impose a great hardship on an attorney who wins his appeal for he would have lost all
revenue in the interim. This provision has not yet been challenged.
6 Each of the twenty-four verified complaints considered in 1971 required three judges
to hear the trial. This means that seventy-two judges were engaged in activity which could
very well have been handled by the bar. See Appendix.
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munity for all statements made without malice in the course of any
proceeding before the bar. 2 This protection may make the public less
reluctant to report complaints to the district committees. The district
committees would be retained"3 and the proceedings before the commit-
tees would be substantially the same except that the committees would
have certain disciplinary powers. They would have the authority to infor-
mally admonish an attorney at the conclusion of a preliminary investiga-
tion 4 and to issue private reprimands at the conclusion of any formal
hearings. Possession of this minor disciplinary authority would relieve
the district committees of the dilemma of either dismissing a complaint
or exposing an attorney to adverse publicity for a minor charge which
might not be proven. There would be no appeal from such a reprimand
and the attorney's only redress would be to demand that the charges be
taken before a newly created Disciplinary Board."
The Board would consist of twelve members appointed by the court
upon recommendation of the Council of the Virginia State Bar. It would
be the duty of this Board to hear complaints brought before it by petitions
62Preliminary draft of Suggested Amendment to Rule 13 of the Rules for Integration
of the Virginia State Bar § (1) [hereinafter cited as Amendment]. Such conditional immun-
ity was rejected by the ABA Special Committee, which recommended that absolute immun-
ity be granted in order to protect complainants against suits designed to "teach the com-
plainant a lesson." If an attorney alleged that the complaint was made maliciously, he could
bring suit with little expense to himself while forcing the complainant to incur the expense
and effort of defending the action. The Committee found no justification for imposing con-
ditions on the immunity because, since the proceedings are not public, there is no damage
sustained by the attorney. The desirability of having all complaints, even doubtful ones,
brought to the district committee's attention seems to outweigh the slight possibility of
injury to the attorney from malicious complaints. ABA SPECIAL COMM. 74-75.
This Amendment does not provide immunity from criminal prosecution. Such immun-
ity could probably only be provided by statute. ABA SPECIAL COMM. 90-91.
0 Amendment § (b).
"I1d. § (t)(i).
151d. This hearing may be called a "probable cause hearing" but there is opposition to
this term because of the connotations of criminal procedure. Such overtones are quite
misleading since the phrase refers to probable cause to file a complaint with the Disciplinary
Board. Smith Interview, supra note 13. Whatever the name, the proceedings will be essen-
tially the same as the formal hearing in the existing procedure and the accused attorney
will have all the same rights. Compare Amendment § (f)(i) with RULE 13(e).
"See text accompanying note 34 supra.
6Amendment § (f)(i). The possibility that the Disciplinary Board might impose a
harsher penalty than the district committee had imposed may deter all but those who are
most emphatic about their innocence from taking this step, but since the hearing is a de
novo proceeding, there is no expectation of constitutional problems with this provision.
Smith Interview, supra note 13.
esThe official name of this body would be "The Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board."
Amendment (a).
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from the district committees or from private individuals, investigate such
complaints, and to discipline attorneys found guilty.69 The accused attor-
ney would be given an opportunity to answer the petition, but if he failed
to do so, the allegations would be taken as admitted.7 1 If the charges were
denied, a de novo hearing would be held. 71 The action would be prose-
cuted by a newly created officer, the Bar Counsel,72 and the burden of
proof would be on him.
73
At the conclusion of this hearing the Board would dismiss the com-
plaint, issue a private reprimand, publicly censure the attorney, suspend
him or disbar him. 74 There are no standards specified in the Amendment
for determining what quantum of proof is required to prove the charges
7
or what penalty should be imposed for particular misconduct.




72ld. § (c)(ii). The office of Bar Counsel, which would be similar to the existing Special
Counsel, may be responsive to the ABA Special Committee's recommendation that the bar
seek full time professional staff for disciplinary enforcement. ABA SPECIAL COMM. 48-56.
The ABA recommendation envisioned a larger staff, but the Virginia plan is apparently
limited by the financial resources of the bar. Smith Interview, supra note 13. At least one
of the district committees have requested such an officer to replace the commonwealth's
attorneys as prosecuters. Groseclose Letter, supra note 20.
The Bar Counsel would have wide powers, including investigating power. The amend-
ment provides:
(c) Bar Counsel. Bar Counsel and such assistants as may be appointed
shall have the power and duty:
(i) to investigate all matters involving alleged misconduct by
an attorney subject to the jurisdiction of this Court called to his
attention whether by complaint of otherwise;
(ii) to prosecute all disciplinary proceedings before the Board
and this Court;
(iii) to assist the Commonwealth's Attorney in all disciplinary
matters before courts of record;
(iv) to appear at hearings held by District Committees where
practicable and at hearings with respect to motions for rein-
statement by suspended or disbarred attorneys, to cross exam-
ine witnesses testifying in support of the motion and to marshall
available evidence, if any, in opposition thereto;
(v) to represent the Virginia State Bar upon request on all
matters relating to the unauthorized practice of law; and
(vi) to perform such other functions as may be designated by
the Board which are not inconsistent with these rules.
Amendment § (c).
"Id. § (q).
7 Id. § (f)(ii).
75Perhaps the Board will apply the same standards as the three-judge panel: "clear
proof." See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
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actually imposes the penalty may be issued by the Disciplinary Board.
The Board makes a "written order which shall be final and binding unless
the respondent-attorney files a notice of intent to request a review by the
Supreme Court . . ... " Thus, Virginia would have two bodies which
would have the power of disbarment, the bar and the courts.
77
This sharing of the disciplinary power is contrary to the commands
of at least one statute. Section 54-51 of the Virginia Code provides:
[t]he Supreme Court of Appeals shall not adopt. . . any rule
or regulation or method of procedure. . which will provide for
any additional method for the trial of attorneys in disbarment or
suspension proceedings except those now provided for by statute
78
The preamble of the Amendment notes that the court has "inherent
power to supervise the conduct of attorneys who are its officers .... ,,71
But rather than assert this inherent power, it is more likely that the court
and the bar will attempt to persuade the legislature to alter the conflicting
statute before adoption of the proposed Amendment." To make such a
change more appealing to the legislature, the draftsmen of the Amend-
ment have included a provision which- would give the accused attorney a
choice when the district committee filed a petition with the Disciplinary
Board.s" He could go on with the proceedings before the Board or he
could demand that the charges be brought against him in accord with the
provisions of section 54-74 of the Virginia Code.8
An attorney could gain certain advantages by electing the procedure
before the Board rather than the procedure before the three-judge panel.
His most important advantage would be that all proceedings are kept
confidential until the effective date of any order imposing a penalty.1
By taking this option, the attorney who felt that he was innocent could
"Amendment § (f)(ii). The process of review by the supreme court is described in
Amendment § (f)(iii).
nBy comparison, in California, which has a roughly similar structure for dealing with
disciplinary actions, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6075 et seq., 6100 et seq. (West 1962),
the power to make the final order remains with the court whether or not the attorney
exercises his statutory right of appeal. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6083-84 (West 1962).
"8VA. CODE ANN. § 54-51 (Repl. Vol. 1972).
"Amendment Preamble. See also note 37 supra.
BOSmith Interview, supra note 13; Wrenn Interview, supra note 21.
gild.
82Amendment § (f)(ii). In the event this option is elected, the procedure would be
almost the same as the existing procedures. The only difference would be that the Board,
not the district committee, would file the verified complaint and the Bar Counsel would
assist in the prosecution.
'OId. § (b).
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avoid unfavorable publicity to which he would be subjected in the court
proceedings even if he were exonerated. There also might be a tactical
advantage in choosing the bar proceedings. The case might be heard by
a committee of as few as five Board members, three of whom could
convict. 4 This would be no advantage over the three-judge panel, but if
a larger committee or the full Board heard the case, the prosecutor, who
must bear the burden of proof,"5 would have to convince a larger number
of persons of the attorney's guilt in order to obtain a conviction.
Under certain circumstances, there might be an advantage in electing
the court procedures. The Board might be known to find against an
attorney consistently on a given set of facts or might be known to impose
a strict penalty. Further, the judge in the jurisdiction where the verified
complaint would be filed might be known to be more sympathetic to the
attorneys. If charges were brought against an attorney in such a situation,
he would clearly prefer to elect to go before the three-judge court rather
than face the Board.
The Amendment would raise no insoluble legal problems if the con-
flicting statute8 were removed. The procedure would meet due process
requirements since the attorney would have both notice and an opportun-
ity to defend before the district committee and the Disciplinary Board. 7
Even the fact that the Board rather than the court may issue the final
order in some instances would not pose any serious problems since the
accused may elect the judicial procedures or he may have judicial review
of the bar proceedings. 8 Further, since the procedure would be contained
in the Rules of Court, the Board or the committee would be acting as an
arm of the court and under its authority.
8 9
While any legal problems raised by the Amendment may be readily
solved, some practical defects remain and these may prove more challeng-
ing. Despite the grant of minor disciplinary authority, the continued use
of the district committees may be viewed as a weakness by some critics.
The ABA Special Committee recommends greater centralization to
achieve uniformity and to avoid the influence of personalities and position
which may impair the effectiveness of the diversified local bodies.90 How-
8ld. § (a).
'Id. § (q).
8"See text accompanying note 78 supra.
"See Amendment §§ (O(i)-(ii)
"Apparently review may be had only at the election of the attorney. There is no
provision for review on request of the district committee of the Bar Counsel. Amendment-
§ (f)(iii).
"This would be true under the court's inherent authority to discipline its officers, note
37 supra, or the statutory grant of authority, VA. CODE ANN. § 54-48(c) (Repl. Vol. 1972).
"The ABA Special Committee cites New York as an example of the effectiveness of a
small number of full-time, active disciplinary agencies compared to the more common
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ever, the Virginia draftsmen, in retaining the existing system, reflected the
opinions of the administrators of that system."
While nothing can alleviate the "dragging of feet"9" at the local level
when a complaint of a socially or politically sensitive nature is received,
there are ways to shorten the long delays which often attend disbarment
proceedings.13 The ABA Special Committee suggests that time is wasted
by needlessly repetitive adversary proceedings. 4 The district committees
could act as screening bodies, holding only informal proceedings or inves-
tigations. The formal adversary proceedings could be left to the Board if
the investigation showed a strong probability that there had been some
misconduct. Such a practice would injure neither the complainant nor the
attorney since the former could take his complaint directly to the courts
or to the Board if the committee rejected his position," and the attorney
would still have his privacy protected at this point9 and his rights guaran-
teed by due process. 7 From a tactical standpoint however, an attorney
might prefer to have as many full proceedings as possible.
The most important benefit of the Amendment would be the standar-
dization resulting from centralizing the power to disbar in the Discipli-
nary Board. The diversity in the existing system would remain in the
alternative procedures permitted under section 54-74 of the Virginia
Code, but the Board could be internally consistent on matters of proof
and penalties, thus creating much needed predictability."
Additional benefits would be derived from the Board's power to deal
district committee system. New York has the largest attorney population in the country,
yet all discipline is handled through four regional departments. ABA SPECIAL COMM. 28-
29. See also Clark, Disciplinary Procedures for the Bar, 39 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 484,487 (1968).
"At present, some committee members favor the retention of the district committees
with power to administer minor discipline, and some suggest that even smaller units may
be desirable. They cite the example of the local bar at Charlottesville which handles many
complaints before they ever get to the district committee. Hess Interview, supra note 9;
Groseclose Letter, supra note 20.
2Clark, Disciplinary Procedures for the Bar, 39 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 484, 485 (1968).
'3In Nolan v. Forste, 252 Ind. 199, 247 N.E.2d 60 (1969), four years elapsed between
the filing of the original action and the final order. See also ABA SPECIAL COMM. 30-33.
This occurs in Virginia too. Many cases are carried over from one year to the next. See
Appendix infra. Groesclose Letter, supra note 20.
"ABA SPECIAL COMM. 30-33. The only provision in the Amendment which contributes
to accelerating the proceedings is a provision that any appeal which shall be taken from
the final order of the Board shall have priority over other items on the supreme court's
schedule. Amendment § (f(iii).
IsSee VA. CODE ANN. § 54-74(1) (Repl. Vol. 1972); Amendment § (a)(i).
"See Amendment § (p).
97See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
"It would seem necessary to have a written record of the proceedings, not only to insure
the desired consistency with regard to subsequent cases, but also to aid in appellate review
in any given case. There is no specific requirement of such a record in the Amendment.
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with several matters which are not presently covered by any statute or
rule. For example, section 54-73 of the Virginia Code states that the court
shall disbar an attorney "on proof being made that he has been convicted
of a felony . . ... ,' The statute is not specific as to how or when this is
to be done. The Amendment provides for immediate suspension pending
appeals from the conviction of a felony and a hearing before the Board
after all appeals have been exhausted to determine the extent of the final
discipline.' 0
Another problem has been the practice of surrendering a license after
the attorney is under disciplinary investigation. This privilege was widely
abused by attorneys in some jurisdictions since the conditions under
which the license was surrendered and the consequences of that action
were not clearly defined.' 0' Such confusion would be avoided by the
Amendment which provides that the attorney would be required to sign
an affidavit providing, among other things, that he is aware there is a
complaint against him; that the charges are true; and that he could not
successfully defend against the charge.12 The Board would then issue a
public order disbarring the attorney "on consent" though the affidavit
would not be made public. 03
"VA. CODE ANN. § 54-73 (Repl. Vol. 1972).
1®Amendment § (g)(i). This is in accord with the ABA Special Committee recommen-
dation which was highly critical of procedures which would allow a convicted attorney to
practice up to several years while appeals were pending. ABA SPECIAL COMM. 122.
The Special Committee also recommended that no disciplinary proceedings be initiated
until a conviction was obtained or until a verdict was had in a civil case where the discipli-
nary action was based on the same facts. ABA SPECIAL COMM. 82. Present Virginia proce-
dure apparently follows this course though there does not appear to be any statute or rule
which demands this result. Smith Interview, supra note 13. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-73 (Repl.
Vol. 1972) provides in part that disbarment or suspension results "on proof being made that
[an attorney] has been convicted of a felony. . . or of any corrupt unprofessional conduct
. .. But a felony, whether or not committed in a professional capacity, Norfolk &
Portsmouth Bar Ass'n v. Drewry, 161 Va. 833, 172 S.E. 282 (1934), would certainly qualify
as corrupt conduct. See Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 304 (1883) (Field, J., Dissenting).
Thus an attorney could theoretically be disbarred even absent a conviction. California
codified such a rule. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6106 (West 1962).
The Amendment is slightly clearer than the existing void. It provides that disbarment
would result upon the "filing with the Board of a certificate demonstrating that an attorney
has been convicted. ... Amendment § (g)(i). Similar wording in an Arizona statute was
held in In re Metheany, 104 Ariz. 144, 449 P.2d 609 (1969) to prevent disbarment proceed-
ings based on a criminal offense in the absence of a final conviction. ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 32-267 (1956).
"'ABA SPECIAL COMM. 101. See also Clark, Disciplinary Procedures for the Bar, 39
PA. B. ASS'N Q. 484 (1968); Note, Legal Profession-Resignation from the Bar Under
Charges, 26 Mo. L. REV. 90 (1961). This practice is apparently not prevalent in Virginia




The Board would also be given specific authority to deal with attor-
neys admitted to practice in Virginia who have been disciplined in another
state,104 who have been declared to be incompetent,0 5 or who have been
alleged to be incapacitated."'6 Here again, the power to suspend is given
to the Board. Presumably the right to have the Board's order reviewed
by the supreme court would be the same for these procedures as for
regular discipline," 7 but this is not specified in the text of the Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Of the many flaws which exist in the disciplinary procedures presently
in effect in Virginia, three are particularly important. There are too many
barriers to complaints reaching the disciplinary body.' There is a lack
"'4The attorney would be given a hearing where he may attempt to show:
(a) that the procedure [in the foreign jurisdiction] was so lacking in
notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due
process;
(b) there was such an infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as
to give rise to the clear conviction that this Board should not accept as
final the conclusion on that subject; or
(c) that the imposition of the same discipline by this Board would result
in grave injustice; or
(d) that the misconduct established has been held by this Board to war-
rant substantially different discipline. The attorney's response shall be
limited to the above enumerated criteria ....
Amendment § (g)(v).
"'The attorney would be suspended for an indefinite period. Id. § (g)(ii).
"'The Board would determine the attorney's fitness in a hearing of which he may be
given notice if the Board deems it "proper and advisible." If he is found unfit he is indefi-
nitely suspended. See Amendment (g) (iii). If he is not given notice, there would seem to be
a due process violation. See text accompanying note 52 supra. See also ABA SPECIAL
COMM. 110.
Amendment § (g)(iv) provides:
If, during the course of any proceedings. . . the respondent contends that
he is suffering a disability by reason of mental or physical infirmity ...
or. . . addiction to drugs or intoxicants, which make it impossible for the
respondent to adequately defend himself . . . the Board shall enter an
order immediately suspending the respondent . . . until a determination
is made of the respondent's capacity to continue to practice law . ...
When the attorney who is suspended under this paragraph applies for reinstatement,
he must prove his fitness by "clear and convincing evidence," and he waives any doctor-
patient privilege by his application. Amendment § (g)(iv).
101See Amendment § (f)(iii).
"'8These barriers include fear and lack of knowledge of the existence, function, and
membership of the district committees on the part of the public; inertia and protectiveness
on the part of attorneys; and lack of time, funds, and aggressiveness on the part of the
district committees.
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of uniformity in procedures, standards, and penalties. The courts bear too
much of the responsibility for disciplining attorneys while the bar bears
too little.
The proposed Amendment would correct some of these defects. The
qualified immunity from civil suits, if sufficiently publicized, may encour-
age people to come forward with legitimate complaints, but there is
apparently no provision which would increase the effectiveness of the
district committees as an initiator of complaints in the disciplinary proce-
dure. The establishment of the office of Bar Counsel may help somewhat,
but this is envisioned, initially at least, as a small office. 9 While the Bar
Counsel will be authorized to make investigations,"0 because of limited
resources, his main activity would probably be limited to prosecutorial
functions."' Thus, the principal benefit will be derived by the common-
wealth's attorneys" 2 and the Attorney General who now perform those
functions.
Though diversity would remain at the important local level, uniform-
ity would be achieved above that by the creation of the centralized Disci-
plinary Board. This uniformity may be the largest single benefit which
the Amendment could provide because it would greatly increase the pre-
dictability of these proceedings and it would assure that the penalty im-
pose on an attorney will depend solely on the nature of the misconduct."'
The grant of authority to the district committee for minor disciplining
and to the Disciplinary Board for the more stringent penalties would free
the judges of the state for other matters."' This would be accomplished
without entirely removing disciplinary procedures from the courts since
the attorney would have the right to have the charges heard by the court
or to have judicial review of the bar proceedings. Thus, while the pro-
posed Amendment does not answer all objections, if the statutory barriers
10Smith Interview, supra note 13.
"'Amendment § (c)(i).
"'Smith Interview, supra, note 13.
".VA. CODE ANN. § 54-74(3) (Repl. Vol. 1972).
131n explaining the reasons for adopting a system similar to the one in the proposed
Amendment, one spokesman has said:
The thinking behind establishing this . . . board was that they wanted to
get away from the local influence that you have in the common pleas
court. The bar politics-whether or not the man was well liked or well
disliked. We thought we could achieve more uniformity of discipline, and
this was a real problem. In one part of the state, embezzlement would be
grounds for disbarment, and in another part of the state, if the accused
got a private reprimand, it might be considered a real accomplishment.
ABA SPECIAL COMM. 28.
"'See note 61 supra.
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to its enactment can be overcome,"' it will provide many important im-
provements for both the disciplinary system and the accused attorney.
GREGORY J. DIGEL
r5The supreme court could choose to exercise its inherent authority (see note 79 supra)
and adopt these procedures regardless of whether or not the legislature altered the statutes.
Smith Interview, sapra note 13; Wrenn Interview, supra note 21.
APPENDIX
The following is a statistical summary of the disciplinary actions by the Virginia State Bar
for the year June 30, 1970 to June 30, 1971:
Complaints pending 6/30/70 50
Complaints received 6/30/70 to 6/30/71 190
TOTAL 240
Complaints Dismissed without formal hearing 151.
89
Complaints Docketed for formal
hearing as of 6/30/71 32
Complaints under investigation as of 6/30/71 13
TOTAL 45 45
Formal Hearing Held 44
Dismissed after formal hearing 16
To be verified to one judge
or three judge court 28
Not yet verified to any court 5
Verified to either one judge
or three judge courts 23
Verified to three judge court 16
Verified to one judge court 7
TOTAL 23 23
0
Verified Complaints in three judge courts
Carried over from previous year 8





Surrender of license I
Suspension 1
Pending 18
Verified Complaints in one-judge courts
Carried over from previous year 2






Wrenn Letter, supra note 25.
